Jannik Sinner rehires Umberto Ferrara, CAS arbitration limited by ECJ, TADP Quarterly Reports for Q1 and Q2/25

The news of Jannik Sinner rehiring his former fitness coach Umberto Ferrara, who had been released almost exactly one year ago during the aftermath of Sinner’s Clostebol case, is noteworthy for several reasons. First, let us recall the defense strategy pursued by Sinner’s legal team, which involved two major points:

(1) Establish that Sinner did everything in his power to ensure that no prohibited substance would enter his system.
(2) Demonstrate that the substance in question has been “administered” instead of “Administered.”
As had been laid out in the original article on Sinner on here, (2) is mostly a legal sophistry whose primary purpose was to eliminate the period of ineligibility of at least two years that would apply even if (1) holds.

As we all know, this approach was ultimately successful. Part of this legal strategy was also the firing of both Ferrara and Naldi, which happened only after the case had become public, instead of when Sinner was alleged to become aware of the negligence of both Ferrara and Naldi. The implication was that Sinner bore “No Fault or Negligence” because he hired trusted professionals, and could not have reasonably expected or assumed that these professionals would be negligent. Hence, for this strategy to work, it must be made clear that both Ferrara and Naldi were negligent, and the ITIA decision plainly recognizes this. On Ferrara, the decision explicitly states:

Mr Ferrara knew that Mr Naldi would be applying the Trofodermin Spray to his bare hands and knew or ought to have known that Mr Naldi would be subsequently touching the Player. Therefore, whether or not Mr Ferrara notified Mr Naldi of the presence of a Prohibited Substance in the Spray, it must have been apparent (to him, at least) that the Player risked coming into contact with a Prohibited Substance and could subsequently test positive.

DECISION OF THE INDEPENDENT TRIBUNAL

For context, the accounts on whether Ferrara informed Naldi of the contents of the spray or not differ between Ferrara and Naldi—Ferrara asserts that he warned Naldi, Naldi asserts that he did not. The tribunal considered this question ultimately not relevant, and concluded that Ferrara was negligent regardless of which account is the correct one.

Accordingly, it is a legally established fact that Ferrara was negligent, regardless of whether Ferrara or Sinner agrees. Obviously, there are many other professionals that could perform the same services as Ferrara, one of which Sinner had already hired, yet fired shortly before Ferrara was rehired. Irrespective of what was argued in the case, it seems clear that Sinner is of the opinion that Ferrara has not been negligent, and that he still trusts him to work as both his fitness coach and anti-doping expert—after all, the ITIA decision asserted that Ferrara was “specifically chosen by the Player to advise him and the team on anti-doping matters.” Since there is no reason to believe that Sinner has changed his mind on Ferrara at some point, as no new facts or similar have been revealed since the case, it appears that Sinner has always held this opinion. But if he always held this opinion, then why did he fire Ferrara after the case had become public? It seems increasingly likely that this firing only was done for the public, as if Sinner really did consider Ferrara negligent, he would have fired him right when becoming aware of his negligence. This, of course, calls into question whether the account given by Sinner’s legal team was ever truthful. Why would Sinner’s opinion of Ferrara differ so fundamentally from the assertions given in Sinner’s case?

The decision to rehire Ferrara is also puzzling from another perspective. A main component of Sinner’s legal defense was establishing that Sinner complied with his duty of “utmost caution.” Throughout the case, Ferrara has been established as negligent, which is why employing Ferrara’s services yet again while being aware of said negligence certainly appears incompatible with said duty of “utmost caution,” if a similar case were to arise again. Sinner must be absolutely confident that he’ll never be in a similar situation again, as laying the blame on one’s employees is no longer a possible avenue if the employee in question has already been established as negligent, yet rehired regardless.

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In other news, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that decisions made by the CAS are subject to a review by national courts to ensure their alignment with EU law and policies. Until now, any arbitrations by the CAS were considered final if confirmed by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. As a result of this ruling, this finality is no longer a given, and decisions pertaining to EU jurisdiction can and likely will be challenged by national courts.

To which degree this will affect future arbitrations by the CAS remains to be seen, but for tennis in particular, where many cases ultimately went to the CAS, it seems likely that future decisions may be less charitable towards the athletes, as the level of scrutiny the decisions may be subjected to can be assumed to be higher. In the past, the ITIA often was unsuccessful when cases were escalated to the CAS, such as in the case of Simona Halep.

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Lastly, the ITIA has released the quarterly reports for both Q1/25 and Q2/25, which are provided below:

Q1/25	Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition (urine)	1,239	713	526
In-Competition (blood)	83	46	37
In-Competition (DBS)	0	0	0
In-Competition (ABP)	0	0	0
Out-of-Competition (urine)	418	195	223
Out-of-Competition (blood)	170	79	91
Out-of-Competition (ABP)	300	145	155
Out-of-Competition (DBS)	32	8	24
TOTALS	2242	1186	1056

When comparing these numbers to Q1/24, two major observations can be made:
(1) The number of in-competition blood samples has increased significantly. Instead of 34 samples taken in 2024, 83 samples have been taken in 2025. The total number of out-of-competition blood samples, on the other hand, has remained virtually the same at 502, as opposed to 501 last year.
(2) We’re also seeing an uptick in urine samples taken, both in-competition and out-of-competition, which largely accounts for the increase in total samples taken from 1994 to 2242 (+12.4%).

Q2/25	Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition (urine)	1305	767	538
In-Competition (blood)	81	41	40
In-Competition (DBS)	0	0	0
In-Competition (ABP)	0	0	0
Out-of-Competition (urine)	414	209	205
Out-of-Competition (blood)	109	53	56
Out-of-Competition (ABP)	241	116	125
Out-of-Competition (DBS)	15	9	6
Totals	2,165	1,195	970

Q2/25, on the other hand, presents the opposite trend. The number of in-competition blood samples has remained virtually the same, but the total number of out-of-competition blood samples has basically halved, going down from 655 to 365 (-44.3%). Since the number of urine samples has stayed virtually the same, we’re accordingly seeing a year-over-year decrease in total number of samples taken from 2530 to 2165 (-14.4%).

WADA agrees to a case resolution settlement with Jannik Sinner, TADP Q4/24 Quarterly Report

After appealing the decision arbitrated by the ITIA back in September, the WADA has now come to an agreement to settle the case of Jannik Sinner, and subsequently withdrawn the appeal to the CAS. In the statement made by the WADA, it is outlined that the WADA accepts that there was no intent to cheat from Sinner, no performance-enhancing benefit, and ultimately no fault or negligence on Sinner’s part. Yet, given negligence on the part of his team, a 3-month suspension has been deemed appropriate. Conveniently for Sinner, the period of ineligibility will end before the French Open, and even grant him ample time for preparation.

This outcome is curious in that by and large, the reasoning behind this settlement is in full agreement with the original decision of the ITIA, begging the question why the WADA opted to appeal in the first place, given that WADA appears to take no issue with its content. Appealing to the CAS would imply that at least some parts of the decision are contested by the WADA. In fact, the reasons for appealing were originally stated as follows:

It is WADA’s view that the finding of “no fault or negligence” was not correct under the applicable rules. WADA is seeking a period of ineligibility of between one and two years.

After intending for a period of ineligibility of 1 to 2 years, settling for a 3-month suspension only seems plausible if Sinner has produced new evidence, yet nothing of the sort is mentioned or merely hinted at. Accordingly, it remains unclear what was provided by Sinner’s legal team that successfully changed WADA’s opinion of the case. This, of course, once again raises the question of transparency, or rather the lack thereof. Whatever transpired behind the scenes will only be known to the involved parties, but not the general public. Ultimately, we arrive at a junction of two equally undesirable possibilities: (1) either Sinner has not produced any new evidence or arguments, and the WADA changed their assessment based on something materially unrelated to the case; or (2) Sinner has produced new evidence or arguments, but whether these are convincing or sound cannot be reviewed by the general public.

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What can be reviewed, however, is the TADP quarterly report for Q4/24 issued by the ITIA:

Total Q4 Samples	Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition (urine)	1222	655	567
In-Competition (blood)	3	3	0
In-Competition (DBS)	5	5	0
In-Competition (ABP)	1	1	0
Out-of-Competition (Urine)	410	210	200
Out-of-Competition (Blood)	217	113	104
Out-of-Competition (DBS)	1	1	0
Out-of-Competition (ABP)	215	106	109
Totals	2,074	1,094	980

Compared to Q4/23, Q4/24 represents a rather larger uptick in urine samples taken in particular, from 747 to 1222 (+64%). This increase accounts almost in full for the increase in total samples taken as well (1539 to 2074, +35%), as the number of blood samples taken has remained almost the same. In fact, this is the first time a fourth quarter has exceeded the number of 2000 samples taken in total. Here’s hoping that this marks the beginning of a much needed turn towards a broadening of the testing regime.

Decision in the case of Iga Swiatek, TADP Q3/24 Quarterly Report

The full decision regarding the case of Iga Swiatek has been published, and while her case is much more straightforward than Jannik Sinner’s, there are still several interesting takeaways included. First, a short summary of the events as depicted in the decision:

• On August 12th 2024, Swiatek provided an out-of-competition urine sample ahead of the Cincinnati Open, and both the A and B sample were tested positive for trimetazidine (TMZ for short), which is a medical drug primarily used to treat angina pectoris, as it increases coronary flow reserve, among other things. Its usefulness as a PED is at least debated, though the number of athletes that used it as one suggest some usefulness after all, with the most notable case being that of 23 Chinese swimmers testing positive ahead of the 2021 Olympics.
• No traces of TMZ have been found in samples collected on August 1st and 2nd during the Olympics in Paris as well as on August 27th at the US Open.
• According to Swiatek, the TMZ in her system is due to a Melatonin product ingested roughly five hours prior to the test. According to multiple lab tests, other tablets of the same container of said product were found to be contaminated, along with a sealed container of the same batch. Swiatek was able to provide receipts proving that the specific container in question was purchased at a Polish pharmacy not far from her home. Swiatek had been using this product for years, and it has been manufactured by a reputable medical company.
• When Swiatek was asked to list all the supplements or medications taken prior, she neglected to list the Melatonin product. Swiatek asserted that she “forgot” due to being tired, and the product had not been included on a list of products she typically copies her declaration from.
• According to medical experts, the concentration of TMZ found in the sample is consistent with the usage extent and timeframe indicated by Swiatek. Regardless of the concentration, any trace of TMZ found in a player’s system constitutes an anti-doping rule violation (ADRV).

On a surface level, Swiatek’s case seems rather straightforward, though when looking at it more closely, some questions remain nonetheless:

1. The main difference to Sinner’s case lies in the legal strategy available to Swiatek. Unlike Sinner (according to Sinner’s account at least), Swiatek did administer the product in question directly, so any legal sophistry involving a distinction between the product having been “administered” instead of “Administered” is not possible for Swiatek. Neither her ingesting the product nor the product containing TMZ are contested, which is why the defense shifts to whether Swiatek exercised “utmost caution” to avoid an ADRV. By and large, the ITIA has accepted the reasoning given by Swiatek in this regard, and agreed that the player bears “No Significant Fault or Negligence,” resulting in a maximum ineligibility period of 24 months, which may be reduced by up to 24 months according to discretion. A period of one month has been imposed, and Swiatek has accepted this sentencing and waived her right to appeal.
2. According to Swiatek, she had consulted with her physician since 2019, and he recommended her to take the product in question. This is remarkable, for various reasons. First, it has been established that the whole batch has been contaminated, and the reasoning given was that the manufacturer of said product also produces a TMZ product. In addition, other containers of the same batch were found to be contaminated as well. As such, it appears probable that such contamination has taken place before, yet for five years of Swiatek taking this product somewhat frequently, not a single ADRV has occurred. If anything, one would expect that some other Polish players may also take this product, not to mention that TMZ can be detected in a simple urine sample, so the odds would suggest that at some point, an ADRV should have taken place, yet it did not. Given the half life of TMZ of around eight hours, an obvious explanation would be that testing is performed too infrequently to actually detect anything. If taken at face value, this explanation once again would underline and highlight the deficiencies of the current testing regime.
3. Swiatek’s assertion that she did not include the Melatonin product on the doping control form since it wasn’t featured on her list of typical medications is odd, to say the least. After all, Swiatek also asserted that she has been using the product since 2019, so one would expect to find such a regularly used product on that list. The decision merely declares Swiatek’s explanation for the omission as “unsatisfactory” as a whole, but no actual discussion of the incongruity in her account in this regard takes place.
4. Swiatek’s case also shines a light on the process of appeal and provisional suspension, along with its less than ideal implications. From September 12th to October 4th, Swiatek was provisionally suspended, causing her to not attend the WTA 1000 China Open, the WTA 500 Korea Open, and the WTA 1000 Wuhan Open. For the withdrawals, Swiatek cited “personal reasons,” “fatigue,” and “taking time after making changes to her team.” All three of these assertions are demonstrably false, as she was not allowed to participate, yet this was not disclosed at the time. The reason for the non-disclosure of a provisional suspension is a successful appeal, which Swiatek achieved by October 4th, but this policy effectively necessitating players to lie is certainly a less than desirable outcome.

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Those who had hoped that the increased scrutiny tennis has been met with this year would result in testing being ramped up will find such hopes squashed quite quickly by the quarterly report for Q3/24:

Q3/2024	Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition (urine)	1450	972	478
In-Competition (blood)	58	32	26
In-Competition (DBS)	39	19	20
In-Competition (ABP)	1	1	0
Out-of-Competition (urine)	374	183	191
Out-of-Competition (blood)	179	83	96
Out-of-Competition (ABP)	263	124	139
Totals	2,364	1,414	950

While a significant increase in total samples collected over Q3/23 can be noted (1761 to 2364, +32%), Q3/24 merely near-matches Q3/22 in this regard (2507 to 2364, -6%). In particular, Q3/22 saw a significantly higher number in out-of-competition blood samples being collected. We can only look forward to the report for Q4/24, which showed pitiful numbers for the last two years.

The Tall Tale of Jannik Sinner

With the full decision regarding Jannik Sinner’s doping case now being available, examining this case more closely finally becomes worthwhile. While reading the full report is recommended in any case, the main takeaways can be summarized as follows:

• On March 10, 2024 as well as March 18, 2024, the presence of metabolites of Clostebol, which is an anabolic-androgenic steroid, has been found in two urine samples provided by Jannik Sinner. The presence of Clostebol and consequent violation of the TADP rules has not been disputed by Sinner.
• According to the TADP rules, an adverse analytical finding (AAF) constitues an ADRV (anti-doping rule violation), regardless of whether the substance found has been administered intentionally or not, as prohibiting such substances from entering their body ultimately is the player’s utmost duty, and this includes the actions of any of the player’s staff.
• The period of ineligibility imposed by an ADRV can be reduced or eliminated entirely if the player is able to demonstrate that the ADRV was not only not intentional, but also that it occurred on grounds of No (Significant) Fault or Negligence. This is the case provided the player can demonstrate that he or she did not know or could reasonably suspect that a prohibited substance may have been administered. The latter condition is further specified under a Comment to the WADC (World Anti-Doping Code), which states that “No Fault or Negligence would not apply in the following circumstances […] the Administration of a Prohibited Substance by the Athlete’s personal physician or trainer […].” Hence, if this Comment were to apply to Sinner’s case, a period of ineligibility of at minimum two years would have to be imposed.
• According to Sinner, his fitness coach Umberto Ferrara purchased a Trofodermin spray, which contains Clostebol, over the counter in Italy, and recommended to physiotherapist Giacamo Naldi to apply it to heal a cut wound on the little finger of his left hand on March 5. The accounts of both men differ in whether Ferrara warned Naldi of the contents of Trofodermin; Naldi asserts he did not, Ferrara asserts he did. Naldi asserts the spray was used from March 5 throughout March 13.
• On March 10, Naldi allegedly gave Sinner a body massage in the morning, and he asserts that he possibly did not wash hands between administering the spray and treating Sinner, and he did not wear gloves. Sinner suffers from a skin condition which results in superficial small cuts and wounds, facilitating any potential contamination. This is of further relevance in that if applied merely topically, prolonged exposure or potent dosing would have been required to lead to systemic absorption. For cross-contamination to be possible, Sinner’s bloodstream needs to be accessible in some way.
• The experts invited before the tribunal have asserted that the concentration of the substance in each sample could reasonably be caused by the action described by Sinner and his staff, and that the concentration would be low enough to not be considered performance-enhancing.
• The legal strategy pursued by Sinner and his team was to argue that (a) the Comment indicated above did not apply to Sinner’s case, and (b) Sinner did everything in his power to avoid taking a prohibited substance.
• The tribunal essentially accepted this line of thinking, albeit with a certain qualification. While the tribunal asserts that the Comment does apply in the sense that despite the description of “physiotherapist” (which would apply to Naldi) not being mentioned explicitly, it is clearly implied that any personnel would be meant by the Comment, as otherwise an athlete would be able to deny any responsibility simply on the grounds that a prohibited substance had been administered by someone who isn’t a “personal physician or trainer,” as stated by the Comment. However, the tribunal asserted that the definition of “Administration” (note the upper case) as referred to within the Comment does not apply to Sinner’s case, as the substance entered Sinner’s system through cross-contamination, not administration in the strict sense. Hence, if it was not “Administration” in the strict sense, but merely “administration” in a wider sense, then the Comment does not apply, and the only point of consideration is whether Sinner did everything in his power to avoid taking a prohibited substance, and the tribunal considers this to be the case. As such, no period of ineligibility has been imposed.
• The ITIA will not appeal the decision.

This account raises several questions, and of varying severity:

1. Within the decision, it is asserted that Sinner did his due diligence by hiring a professional in Ferrara, who holds a degree in pharmacology, and even owns a pharmacy in Italy. Hence, we can assume that Ferrara was fully aware of Trofodermin containing a banned substance, and would have warned Naldi accordingly. Yet, at the same time, it is argued that it was Ferrara who suggested to Naldi to treat his cut with Trofodermin. Why would someone tasked with avoiding doping contamination at all times deliberately put his client at such a risk, especially given that he essentially has to trust Naldi to avoid contamination, knowing of Sinner’s skin condition no less?
2. According to Naldi’s testimony, he used the spray every morning for eight days, from March 5 until March 13. A detailed account of how the first alleged contamination happened on March 10 has been given, and this may still be considered somewhat plausible, as the treatment was within the context of the competition at Indian Wells. However, at no point was even discussed as to why these massages continued on a daily basis even after Sinner had already exited the tournament, ultimately leading to a second positive sample on March 18, at a point where Naldi no longer was using the spray. The only possible explanation for the second positive sample, which contained a similar concentration as the first one, would be that it would be the remains of a contamination having happened at an earlier point in time, i.e. March 13 or earlier. However, given that the contamination resulting in the first positive test occurred the same day, one would expect the concentration in the second sample to be accordingly lower, especially given the half life of Clostebol of eight hours. Put differently, if the second positive sample is due to the same cross-contamination having happened on March 10, a lower concentration would be expected, given the difference in time passed; if it is not, then there would have to be an explanation as to why the concentration on March 18 is the same as on March 10, even though the spray had last been used on March 13. Keep in mind that the detectability of up to 25 days of the metabolites is a different matter, and not disputed in this regard.
3. Adding to the previous point, one has to wonder as to why Naldi was using the spray for more than a week, given that the bandage could already be removed after just two days. Clearly, Naldi’s wound-healing abilities couldn’t be described as particularly bad or otherwise impeded, which is why it remains unclear why Naldi continued using the spray, all while giving massages every day without washing his hands between the spray application and any treatments.
4. There is an incongruity within Naldi’s account of the series of events. According to his testimony, he cut his finger on March 3, and applied a bandage the same day, which he removed on March 5. It is implied that from this point on, no bandage was used any longer, and the treatment using the Trofodermin spray commenced. Yet, Naldi is clearly shown wearing a bandage on March 10 during the match between Sinner and Jan-Lennard Struff, the same day he allegedly gave Sinner the massage in the morning. As such, we at least know that Naldi applied a bandage after giving Sinner the massage. Even if we assume that Naldi re-applied the bandage every time after applying the spray, further questions remain. If he applied the spray, applied the bandage, and then gave Sinner the massage without washing his hands inbetween, it seems unlikely that any cross-contamination would have happened, unless we further assume that the spray was applied across Naldi’s entire hand. Likewise, the account that Naldi applied the spray, yet did not apply the bandage until after giving Sinner the massage without washing his hands inbetween seems even more implausible.
5. According to his own testimony, Naldi has worked for two professional basketball teams as a physiotherapist, and we also know that he is Italian. As such, it seems implausible that he would not be aware of Trofodermin containing Clostebol, especially given that the warning sign on the packaging isn’t exactly subtle, as can be seen below. Granted, Sinner’s team alleged that the packaging had been disposed of before Ferrara handed the spray over to Naldi, but this seems almost deliberate given the way the packaging doesn’t leave much room for any “I did not know” testimonies. In this regard, it also seems awfully convenient how Naldi was eventually fired by Sinner. If Naldi was fired for his negligence, then doing so would have been not only possible, but arguably mandatory as soon as Sinner had known of his negligence in order to protect his integrity. Yet, the firing only came right after the decision had been made public, as if the reason for firing was public scrutiny, not the negligence itself being exposed as part of said scrutiny.
6. At no point is even the possibility discussed that Sinner may have taken Clostebol through other means, and the contamination account was merely used to mask this usage. This possibility would at least be in line with the idea discussed under (2), as it appears curious that the second sample contained virtually the same concentration even five days after the last treatment. At no point was the possibility of the AAF not being caused by contamination even explored. On this topic, I also recommend reading this excellent article by Honest Sport covering Clostebol doping cases of Italian athletes in recent times. Incidentally, just a few months prior, Italian player Marco Bortolotti too tested positive for Clostebol, yet too was exonerated on the grounds of No Fault or Negligence.
7. In the report, it is claimed that no other tests within a 12-months period showed any AAF, and that Sinner had been tested on average once per month. However, this leaves open the possibility that the other tests happened much earlier than March 10, which is why Sinner not testing positive could simply be due to the fact that he was not tested. Much like in the Halep case, the lack of testing on the side of the ITIA proves to be a major hindrance to making a convincing case in arbitrations like this one.
8. Article 14.1.2 of the WADC states that the anti-doping organization (ADO) in question ought to inform the responsible NADO of any ADRV in a suspected case. From the report, it appears that the Italian NADO was not involved or even notified at any point during the process, which happened entirely under ITIA jurisdiction. This, at the very least, seems odd. In addition, given that Sinner has been found to be guilty of an ADRV, and that this has never been disputed by Sinner’s side, it appears even odder that the ITIA elected not to follow the articles under WADC 14.3 (“Public Disclosure”), which require the ADO to publically disclose this fact within 20 days. The ineligibility part was still pending, hence the ITIA not required (but allowed) to disclose the proceeding regarding this part, yet it chose to not disclose the undisputed ADRV.
9. Arguably the most interesting part of the decision is that the outcome desired by Sinner’s legal team hinges entirely on a legal sophistry. The WADC clearly states that an athlete’s responsibility includes their staff, and the tribunal even mentions this explicitly. They do, however, also accept the idea that cross-contamination of Sinner’s skin through a physiotherapist’s wound is not to be considered “Administration,” as the Comment in question states, but rather “administration” in a wider sense, which is why the Comment does not apply to Sinner’s case. In other words, if this interpretation were to hold, a third-party staff member would be permitted to administer a prohibited substance, as long as he or she does not “Administer” it; i.e., cross-contamination would be “fine,” provided the athlete is unaware. The implications of this are extensive to where one can only hope that this decision finds it way to the CAS. For the general public, it is difficult to understand that the only reason for Sinner not facing a suspension is the idea that the prohibited substance has been “administered” instead of “Administered.”

In any case, it is clear that this case fits neatly into a long series of showings of the ITIA’s inability to run an effective anti-doping program. The lack of any involvement by the Italian NADO, not following WADA protocol, and the many questions raised and unanswered by the decision all contribute to the ITIA once again coming across as incompetent, be it by intent or not, and the decision making being based on political rather than fact-based considerations. Even if we believe that Sinner is not at fault—which remains a possibility—, the lack of transparency and consistency in procedure causing widespread outrage even among Sinner’s fellow competitors cannot be denied.

To iterate on the possibility of Sinner not being at fault, a conceivable scenario would be that the substance indeed was ingested by accident, but the actual series of events differed from the account given by Sinner such that he did bear Fault or Negligence to some degree, and therefore a period of ineligibility should have been imposed. For instance, maybe Sinner himself applied the spray on his own, and the Naldi account was merely construed to allow Sinner pleading for No Fault or Negligence. From the report, we can at least gather that the ITIA made little effort to attack Sinner’s account, and likely was just as interested in not seeing the men’s world number 1 suspended for two years as Sinner was.

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To round things off, the quarterly reports for Q1/24 and Q2/24 are provided below. I spare myself more detailed commentary, aside from mentioning that we do see a small uptick over the pitiful numbers for Q1/23 and Q2/23.

Q1/2024	Men	Women	TOTAL
In-Competition (urine)	700	447	1147
In-Competition (blood)	8	7	15
In-Competition (DBS)	7	9	16
In-Competition (ABP)	1	2	3
Out-of-Competition (urine)	160	152	312
Out-of-Competition (blood)	131	119	250
Out-of-Competition (ABP)	133	118	251
Totals	1,140	854	1994

Q2/2024	Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition – Urine	1340	771	569
In-Competition – Blood	40	20	20
In-Competition – DBS	36	18	18
In-Competition – ABP	3	1	2
Out-of-Competition – Urine	456	240	216
Out-of-Competition – Blood	306	156	150
Out-of-Competition – ABP	349	177	172
Totals	2,530	1,383	1,147

CAS partially upholds Simona Halep appeal

Following last year’s decision in the case of Simona Halep, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has partially upheld Halep’s appeal against said decision. (Update: The full decision of the CAS has been made available here.) As a reminder, the decision was based on two different violations:

• The presence and use of roxadustat as evidenced in Halep’s urine sample collected on 29 August 2022 at the US Open 
• Use of a prohibited substance or method during 2022, based on collection and analysis of 51 blood samples provided by the player as part of the ABP programme 

In regard to the first violation, Halep argued that the prohibited substance had entered her system through a contaminated supplement and therefore unintentionally. In the original decision, the tribunal accepted this explanation, but asserted that the volume ingested by Halep was too small to sufficently explain the concentration of roxadustat in her system. In the CAS ruling, however, this argument is not discussed at all, and instead it solely focuses on the notion that Halep did not ingest roxadustat intentionally. Of course, this completely ignores the fact that if the concentration of roxadustat cannot be explained by the volume of the supplement ingested by Halep, a different exogenous source would have to be present, and it is fair to assume that such a source would have been ingested intentionally by Halep.

In regard to the second violation, things become even more interesting. In the original decision, the ITIA argued that based on a total of 51 blood samples taken for the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP), it was determined that the irregularities found could only explained by a doping program, in turn implying that roxadustat wasn’t the only prohibited substance used by Halep. This argument is essentially dismissed in its entirety by the CAS, and a different argument has been made. Apparently, Halep has provided a private blood sample, which had been administered on 9 September 2022 in preparation for a surgery occurring shortly thereafter. According to the CAS, the argument of the ITIA mainly relied on a blood sample taken on 22 September 2022, and we can infer that the argument brought forward by Halep would be roughly as follows: Given the fact that she did not plan to compete for the remainder of the year following the surgery, and considering the fact that the blood sample from 9 September 2022 presumably did not show irregularities, a doping program being run appears unlikely. Accordingly, the CAS did not contest the notion that irregularities had been present, but rather the idea that they can only be attributed to a doping program. Of particular note here is the fact that at no point is any indication given whether the private blood sample provided by Halep is WADA-compliant, or whether a B-sample exists. In addition, at no point is there any discussion of the fact that an anti-doping violation has occurred, and that it occurred on 29 August 2022, so the idea that there was no intention on Halep’s part to run a doping program for the remainder of the year is only valid if we consider the idea that the roxadustat had been ingested unintentionally to be true. In short, the dismissal of the second charge is only possible due to the first charge having been partially dismissed.

Of course, there is only so much a review of the provided press releases can do, and without access to the detailed evidence, drawing any conclusions would be dubious. Still, I do find it remarkable how the CAS largely dismisses virtually all of the evidence procured by the ITIA, which only leaves two possibilities:
(1) The CAS is biased towards athletes’ rights, and no matter how much evidence would be procured, if there is even a shred of reasonable doubt present, the CAS would rule in the athlete’s favor.
(2) The evidence provided by the ITIA is objectively weak.

Considering the analysis of the testing done by the TADP throughout the years on this blog, we can at least assert that (2) is a reasonable assumption. In fact, as reported earlier on here, we know that there have been exactly zero in-competition blood, ABP, or DBS samples taken during Q4/22, and Q1/22 was the only quarter which saw any in-competition ABP testing at all. All the ITIA could muster was an indirect proof of doping through the ABP, and the only direct proof was the only part of a charge that wasn’t dismissed, but since it was the only adverse finding that had been established, Halep could easily argue that it was all an accident, and that she never had the intention to dope. The bottom line is that a 4-year ban of one of the most prolific doping offenders on the tour has been reduced to a 9-month one, and that certainly isn’t a good look for the ITIA.

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Speaking of “not a good look,” the TADP report for Q4/23 of course comes to mind as well. Since the ITIA had decided not to issue a dedicated report for the Q4/22, drawing any comparisons requires doing some arithmetic by oneself. First, the numbers for Q4/23 as published by the ITIA:

		Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition (urine)		747	463	284
In-Competition (blood)		0	0	0
In-Competition (DBS)		59	39	20
In-Competition (ABP)		0	0	0
Out-of-Competition (urine)		291	145	146
Out-of-Competition (blood)		216	104	112
Out-of-Competition (ABP)		226	113	113
Totals		1 539	864	675

For Q4/22, the total number of samples taken was 1227, which marked a new all-time low. Q4/23, by comparison, is now better at 1539, though this number still falls short of the 1675 samples taken in Q4/21, which was the last year the TADP had still been supervised by the ITF, and which already was a pitiful number by itself. Much like in Q4/22, the complete lack of in-competition DBS or ABP testing continues in Q4/23. With testing this weak, it comes as no surprise that a case such as Halep’s doesn’t survive for more than a couple of hours at the CAS.

TADP Q3/23 Quarterly Report

As the 2023 season has come to a close, it is time to take a look at the latest report of the ITIA for the third quarter of 2023, which also includes numbers for the TADP (tennis anti-doping programme).

	Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition (urine)	1136	680	456
In-Competition (blood)	12	6	6
In-Competition (DBS)	42	20	22
In-Competition (ABP)	4	3	1
Out-of-Competition (urine)	333	171	162
Out-of-Competition (blood)	114	47	67
Out-of-Competition (ABP)	120	49	71
Totals	1761	976	785

After the reports for both Q1 and Q2 of 2023 had the statistic for DBS (dry blood spot) samples collected missing, the report for Q3 includes it again, much like the Q3 report for 2022 a year prior. The latter was the first one to have it listed to begin with, and to this day, it is most curious how this number seemingly comes and goes at random. In the past, we’ve seen that no samples of a specific type having been collected doesn’t result in that type being omitted entirely, but rather in a “0” being reported. Hence, the only logical explanation for the omission of the DBS type in the last two reports is that it has been either forgotten or subsumed under “blood,” neither explanation of which inspires much confidence.

In any case, when comparing Q3 of 2023 with Q3 of 2022, we can see that the number of DBS samples collected has gone down from 72 to 42. Given that the entire point of performing DBS testing was the ability to ramp up testing due to its cost efficiency, one has to wonder why the ITIA has elected to incorporate it in the first place—if anything, it appears to be a cost-cutting measure.

In general, the numbers do not compare favorably to Q3 of 2022. The number of in-competition urine samples collected has gone down by 20.8%, in-competition blood samples by 78.9%, out-of-competition blood samples by 62.6%, out-of-competition ABP samples by 61.8%, and only the number of in-competition urine samples has stayed largely the same. The total number of 1761 samples not only is lower by 29.8% compared to Q3/22, but even lower than the total for Q3/21, which was a pitiful 1902 samples. In short, the anti-doping efforts of the ITF continue to be woefully inadequate.

Decision in the case of Simona Halep

The ITIA has published a statement regarding the case of Simona Halep. An independent tribunal has found Halep guilty of two anti-doping rule violations, resulting in a suspension for a period of four years. The two violations consist of an AAF (adverse analytical finding, i.e., failed doping test) and irregularities found wthin the athlete’s ABP (athlete biological passport). In particular:

• The presence and use of roxadustat as evidenced in Halep’s urine sample collected on 29 August 2022 at the US Open 

• Use of a prohibited substance or method during 2022, based on collection and analysis of 51 blood samples provided by the player as part of the ABP programme 

Of particular interest within the statement are two things:

(1) The AAF has been found through a urine test. Given the wording of the statement, we can surmise that the substance in question has not shown up through the ABP or regular blood testing, as the irregularities found in the ABP constitute a second charge. As such, we can infer that Halep’s doping program included more substances than roxadustat, though the testing has been incapable of detecting the substance in question itself.

(2) The statement identifies no less than 51 blood samples provided by Halep for the ABP. For comparison, for the entirety of 2022, a grand total of 601 designated ABP blood samples have been collected on the women’s side. In addition, the per-player testing statistics for 2021 and 2022 indicate 9 and 17 samples collected in total from Halep, respectively. The ABP has first been adopted by the ITF in 2013, and having been a professional player since before that, Halep had been eligible for testing under the ABP from the very start. Hence, it stands to reason that for a high-profile player such as Halep, roughly five tests are collected per year on average.

After Maria Sharapova, who had been sentenced to a two-year ban in 2016, Halep is the highest-profile female player to receive a doping ban since Martina Hingis. While a doping offender having been caught is certainly laudable, the case also underlines the deficiencies of the TADP, as out of a doping program of at least two substances, only one has been found directly in testing. Given that Halep no doubt will appeal the decision at the CAS, we’ll have to see how much of the four-year ban will eventually remain.

TADP Q2/23 Quarterly Report, US Open Discussion

The ITIA (International Tennis Integrity Agency) has released their quarterly report for Q2 of 2023, which largely focuses on the TACP (tennis anti-corruption programme), but also includes the TADP (tennis anti-doping programme) testing summary. The numbers are rather uneventful, even in how pitiful they are:

Q2/2023	Total samples	Men	Women
In-Competition (urine)	1256	728	528
In-Competition (blood)	55	28	27
In-Competition (ABP)	2	1	1
Out-of-Competition (urine)	419	225	194
Out-of-Competition (blood)	217	121	96
Out-of-Competition (ABP)	224	125	99
Totals	2,173	1,228	945

Looking at the numbers, two things are of note. Compared to Q2/22, we’re seeing a decent uptick in in-competition blood samples collected, while urine samples remain virtually unchanged. In addition, while the out-of-competition urine sample count has gone up, out-of-competition blood and ABP (athlete biological passport) numbers have gone down significantly. As a result, the grand total has gone down as well. Compared to years prior, testing numbers by and large have been stagnant for Q2, even though the ability to ramp up testing (e.g., dry blood spot testing) has been improved. As such, the efforts of the TADP still can only be described as hopelessly inadequate.

TADP Q4/22 and Q1/23 Quarterly Reports, French Open Discussion

For the longest time, the whereabouts of the Q4/22 quarterly report of the TADP (tennis anti-doping programme), which is under the supervision of the ITIA (international tennis integrity agency) as of 2022, had been unclear, but no longer. Instead of releasing a dedicated report for Q4, the ITIA decided to skip that part entirely and instead publish the summary for the entirety of 2022 within their annual review for 2022. Without further ado, here are the numbers:

Q1-4/2022	Total samples	Men	Women
In-competition (urine)	4163	2539	1597
In-competition (blood)	66	31	35
In-competition (ABP)	32	13	19
In-competition (DBS)	72	36	36
Total in-competition	4306	2619	1687
Out-of-competition (urine)	1091	563	528
Out-of-competition (blood)	1005	508	497
Out-of-competition (ABP)	1198	616	582
Total out-of-competition	3294	1687	1607
Totals	7600	4306	3294

When comparing Q1-4/22 to Q1-4/21, which marks the last year the TADP was still directly supervised by the ITF, we can see an increase in the total number of samples taken of 14.6%, which brings 2022’s numbers back up to the same level as 2019’s numbers. This increase mostly comes from the complete lack of in-competition blood and ABP (athlete biological passport) tests observed throughout 2021, which no longer is the case in 2022.

Looking at the numbers, it also becomes clear why the ITIA opted for not releasing a dedicated report for Q4/22. The total number of samples taken for Q4/22 is 1227, which marks a new low, falling short of even 2021’s woeful numbers by 26.7%. Had it not been for the substantial increase in Q3/22, the grand total for 2022 would have looked embarrassing. Of particular note is that there have been exactly zero in-competition blood, ABP, or DBS (dry blood spot) samples taken in Q4/22. In fact, Q1/22 remains the only quarter that saw any in-competition ABP testing at all, which is interesting to say the least.

Another interesting tidbit featured in the annual review for 2022 is the budget. For TADP operations, an expenditure of $4.7 million is indicated, which is $1 million less than the budgets for 2020 and 2021, which were created under ITF supervision still. Most curiously, the chart featured in the annual review omits the figure for 2021 (marked in gray) entirely:

Given that the annual review for 2021 reported the $5.7 million figure, leaving it out of the 2022 one must have been done on purpose. Of course, one could argue that the numbers aren’t entirely comparable, since the $5.7 million possibly included salaries etc., but we can at least say that at best, the budget has stayed the same.

In addition to the annual review for 2022, the ITIA has also published the quarterly report for Q1/23:

Q1/2023	Total samples	Men	Women
In-competition (urine)	805	468	337
In-competition (blood)	22	11	11
In-competition (ABP)	1	1	0
Out-of-competition (urine)	340	175	165
Out-of-competition (blood)	299	149	150
Out-of-competition (ABP)	307	154	153
Totals	1774	958	816

Looking at these numbers, several things are of note:

(1) Compared to Q1/22, we’re seeing an uptick of 12.1% in number of samples collected, which is decent but hardly groundbreaking. For comparison, Q1/19 had a total of 2246 samples taken, so these only look good compared to 2021’s even more woeful numbers.

(2) Unlike in the Q3/22 and Q1-4/22 reports, DBS (dry blood spot) testing samples are no longer listed individually. This leaves two possibilities: Either such samples have not been collected, or they are subsumed under a different heading (i.e., blood).

(3) Regardless of the answer to the question raised in (2), when looking at the $4.7 million budget for 2022, it becomes clear that any hopes that the more cost-effective DBS testing may result in an uptick in sample collection numbers have been misplaced. If anything, the ITIA appears to use DBS solely as a cost-cutting measure, while leaving the number of testing missions unchanged.

Overall, the impression one can get from these numbers is that anti-doping in tennis continues to be little more than window-dressing, as an actual commitment to catch offenders is nowhere to be seen. Even testing numbers from half a decade ago aren’t met (let alone exceeded), and the reports published by the ITIA provide the bare minimum in informational value, despite being released late.

TADP Q3/22 Quarterly Report, Australian Open Discussion

With the report for Q4/22 still pending, there is little to analyze aside from the report given for Q3/22. Thankfully, the latter does provide something newsworthy, which is the introduction of dry blood spot (DBS) testing as of Q3. This has been made possible by the WADA formally allowing the conduction of DBS testing at WADA-sanctioned events as of 1 September 2021, which includes results from such testing being just as valid as those from regular blood sample tests. The main benefits DBS testing has over regular blood sample testing are threefold: (1) First, the process is less intrusive as only capillary blood is collected; (2) second, as a result, the process is faster, thus allowing for a higher number of tests conducted at an event; and (3) third, it is cheaper, which too may result in a higher number of tests being possible. On the other hand, considering that the sample contains less blood, the sample may provide less opportunities for analysis depending on the abilities of the lab conducting the analysis.

For years, blood testing has been on a downward trajectory in tennis, so any changes that may reverse this trend are no doubt welcome. The real question, however, is whether these theoretical benefits indeed are realized in practice. Thankfully, when looking at the numbers, this appears to be the case:

Q3/22	Total samples	Men	Women
In competition (urine)	1434	920	514
In competition (blood)	57	27	30
In competition (ABP)	0	0	0
In competition (DBS)	72	36	36
Out of competition (urine)	325	157	168
Out of competition (blood)	305	144	161
Out of competition (ABP)	314	150	164
Totals	2507	1434	1073

Compared to Q3/21, we are looking at a significant increase in the number of blood and DBS samples collected in-competition, the former of which were practically zero back when the TADP was still supervised by the ITF, along with a considerable increase in urine samples collected, by 29%. Out-of-competition sample collection too sees major increases, by 55% (urine) and 53% (blood), with APB (athlete biological passport) being the only statistic going down, by 18%. The total number of samples collected has increased by 32%. Overall, these numbers show promise at least, and we can only hope the trend continues in Q4/22.